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Vertical Consolidation and Financial Sustainability: Evidence from English 
Local Government 
 
Abstract. Proponents of the vertical consolidation of lower tier units into a smaller 
number of single-tier local governments suggest that it improves the financial 
sustainability of governments by generating economies of scale and scope. However, 
critics suggest that such structural change is beset with disruptive and unanticipated 
costs that outweigh any potential efficiency savings. I investigate the validity of these 
contrasting arguments by analysing the expenditure and fiscal health of English county 
councils before and after the consolidation of the lower tier units within several counties 
that took place in 2009. Levels of financial sustainability are modelled using a 
difference-in-differences estimator for the years 2003-2012. The results suggest that in 
the short run the consolidated governments have been able to realise administrative 
economies, but their fiscal health has weakened. These findings appear to be robust to 
the possibility of selection effects. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. 
 
Key words: local government reorganization; fiscal centralization; financial performance; 
scale economies; England 
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1 Introduction 
Structural reform of local governments has a long history as a response to both perceived 
weaknesses in service provision and a desire to reap improvements in financial sustainability 
(Dollery, Byrnes and Crase, 2007; Fox and Gurley, 2006). Such reforms may involve the 
amalgamation of small organizations into a new bigger body, the disaggregation of large 
organizations in to smaller units, consolidation of lower-tier units into a higher single tier, or 
the separation of a single into multiple tiers (Dollery and Robotti, 2008). In fact, central 
governments in countries all across the world have enacted, are enacting or are contemplating 
structural changes on the grounds of costs, efficiency and fiscal health (see, for example, 
Local Government Studies, 36, 2, 2010; and Public Finance and Management, 13, 2&3, 
2013; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). The trend has been particularly apparent in England 
where vertical consolidation and horizontal amalgamation of small units into larger ones, in 
an attempt to reap scale and scope economies has been the norm since the 1970s (John, 
2010). The idea that big multi-purpose local governments will have lower costs per resident 
is based on the argument that large units are able to spread fixed administrative costs, 
generate productivity gains through improved resource-utilization and offer more services to 
more people from a smaller number of administrative bases. This argument applies especially 
to vertical consolidation, since multiple layers of administrative duplication can be eradicated 
by bringing the full range of local public services under the control of a single authority.    
Although the putative benefits of structural reforms of local government are often 
touted by policy-makers (John, 1991; 2010), very little is actually known about whether new 
structures ever realize the anticipated scale and scope economies. There is an extensive 
literature on local government reorganization examining the scale economies it is supposed to 
generate in those organizations that might potentially be amalgamated (see Dollery, Grant 
and Kortt, 2012). Many of these studies suggest that bigger local governments are more 
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efficient (e.g. Duncombe and Yinger, 1993; De Boer, 1992), while others point towards the 
emergence of diseconomies of scale after a certain point (e.g. Breunig and Rocaboy, 2008; 
Drew, Dollery and Kort, 2012), or the absence of scale economies altogether (e.g. Derksen, 
1988; Schofield, 1978). In fact, there may be a complex mosaic of linear and nonlinear size 
effects that vary across the different services provided by local governments (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2006a). This means it is difficult to predict with any 
certainty whether reorganizations will work on the basis of prior studies of economies of 
scale in existing units, and points towards the need for research on the effects of structural 
change. Yet, almost nothing is known about the outcome of reforms that involve the vertical 
consolidation of multiple lower-tier units within a single higher tier of government. There 
have been some systematic econometric analyses of the impact of the horizontal 
amalgamations of school districts in the United States (e.g. Gordon and Knight, 2008), and 
on municipalities in Israel (Reinegewertz, 2012). There are also a number of more descriptive 
studies that track changes in expenditure before and after vertical consolidation in Canada 
(Slack and Bird, 2013) and the United States (Faulk, Schaal and Taylor, 2013). However, the 
absence of econometric analyses that produce systematic evidence on the consolidation of 
lower tier into upper-tier units, makes it very difficult to draw firm conclusions about whether 
or not vertical consolidation is likely to work. Despite this evidence gap, many governments 
continue to regard such consolidation as a viable and efficacious reform strategy.     
One of the reasons for the persistence of reorganization as a policy tool is not only the 
belief in economies of scale, but also the argument that fiscal centralization results in better 
local service outcomes. The ‘new regionalists’, in particular, suggest that centralizing control 
over local public services can be a means to averting debt formation, administrative 
duplication and corruption (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; 2005). From this perspective, 
vertical consolidation can contribute to the fiscal discipline required to equalize spatial 
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variations in public sector expenditure, and may be necessary to generate the capacity 
required to leverage any scale and scope economies within the system (Prud’homme, 1995).  
Indeed, the case for the consolidation of lower-tier into upper-tier local governments in 
England has been based on the argument that single tier authorities have better service co-
ordination, clearer accountability, and more streamlined decision making, as well as the 
greater efficiency associated with increased scale. That said, it is possible that the disruptive 
effects of structural change, such as goal displacement, personnel turnover, lower employee 
morale and planning blight (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) are the main outcome of local 
government consolidation – at least, in the short run. For example, the sparse evidence on the 
impacts of structural reform in England suggests that local government consolidation 
generated additional rather than reduced expenditure, at least during the period in which the 
new structures were being put in place (Andrews and Boyne, 2012).   
Does the spending of consolidated local governments rise or fall following structural 
reform? Is the level of fiscal health greater or lower in consolidated organizations? In this 
paper, I seek to provide some preliminary answers to these important theoretical questions by 
applying a difference-in-difference estimator to the financial management of English county 
councils between the years 2003 and 2012. This set of organizations, and the time period in 
which the study is undertaken, represents a valuable context in which to examine the short-
run effects of the vertical consolidation of local governments. In 2009, seven county councils 
in England underwent voluntary reorganization entailing the abolition of the lower tier units 
within the areas that they serve and the consolidation of the functions of those lower tier-units 
with those at the county level into nine new “unitary” authorities. Since local governments in 
the United Kingdom (UK) are very large by international standards and any scale economies 
may already have been exhausted, analysis of the 2009 reform represents a hard test of the 
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efficiency case for structural reform – though one that remains timely given its on-going 
popularity (Williams, 2014).  
The paper will begin by developing theoretical arguments about the rationale for the 
vertical consolidation of local governments. The ways in which the financial sustainability of 
consolidated units of local government might evolve will then be explored. Thereafter, 
measures of local government expenditure and fiscal health, local government consolidation, 
and appropriate control variables will be identified and described, before the results of the 
statistical modelling are presented and discussed. Finally, the conclusion will seek to draw 
out theoretical and practical implications of the findings. 
 
2. Vertical consolidation and financial sustainability  
The financial sustainability of local governments is typically regarded as being a question of 
finding the optimum scale and structure for the cost-efficient delivery of vital local public 
services (see McGinnis, 1999). For policy-makers, the answer to this question is often 
thought to be that “bigger is better” or, at least, “cheaper”, and so local governments should 
be restructured to maximise the potential scale economies that might be present within the 
system. The consolidation of multi-tier local government systems into a simpler and more 
streamlined structure, in particular, has a venerable history as a means for seeking out these 
economies (see Anderson, 1925; Bish, 2001). Consolidated local government units are 
typically expected to benefit from greater economies of scale and scope. At the same time, 
vertical consolidation is also a means for national governments to pursue fiscal discipline and 
equalization by centralizing control over the distribution and management of public money.   
Research suggests that subnational governments can run up large budget surpluses in 
the expectation that national authorities will ‘bale them out’ (Rodden, 2002). Small local 
governments may be particularly prone to financial mismanagement, especially as their 
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capacity for generating tax revenue is typically more restricted (and more critical) than larger 
units (Zafra-Gomez, Antonio and Perez, 2010). This problem may also be exacerbated in a 
multi-tier system, as different tiers often have different priorities and can blame each other 
for perceived failings in service delivery (Crampton, 1996), with citizens unable to determine 
who is accountable for such failures (National Centre for Social Research, 2000). In fact, 
difficulties assigning functions between different tiers of government and establishing 
legitimacy for policy decisions can generate inconsistent outcomes across the whole local 
government system (Dafflon, 1992; Rodríguez-Pose, Tijmstra and Bwire, 2009; West, 
Allmendinger, Nikolai and Barham, 2010).  By contrast, centralized control over resource 
allocation, in theory, widens the scope for fiscal equalization and for reducing the influence 
of local interest groups over service delivery decisions, thereby improving the prospects of 
efficient use of resources (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). In addition, supporters of fiscal 
centralization argue that higher tiers of government are able to pay higher salaries and 
therefore attract the best public managers, which, in turn, can assist them in unlocking any 
economies of scale and scope within the system (Prud’homme, 1995).    
The anticipated scale and scope economies can become a powerful resource that can 
buffer consolidated organizations from the dangers posed by fiscal stress. By gaining greater 
ability to spread fixed costs across a larger client base and to share multiple inputs from 
single sites, consolidated organizations may lower their costs and become more financially 
sustainable in the long run. Nonetheless, despite widespread acknowledgement that the 
rationale underpinning amalgamations and consolidations is highly controversial, precious 
little systematic evidence has been generated to support or reject the claims made on behalf 
of vertical consolidation. Most studies of the impact of such structural reforms rely on 
descriptive statistics (e.g. Chisholm, 2002; Sancton, 1996; Vojnovic, 2000), rather than the 
kind of before and after econometric analysis that can disentangle the “true” impact of change 
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on the financial situation of governments. Although studies using such an approach have 
identified improved financial performance following horizontal amalgamation of similar 
units (e.g. Reingewertz, 2012), few investigate vertical consolidation and it is conceivable 
that the effects of structural change play out differently for this kind of reorganization. 
Although consolidation is anticipated to result in the accrual of scale and scope 
economies, it is quite possible that expenditure will actually rise in consolidated units. First, 
the consolidated units may already have been operating at an optimum spatial scale within a 
multi-tier system, and when brought together accumulate new and unwanted overheads 
(Williamson, 1967). Second, the supposed benefits of fiscal decentralization, such as inter-
jurisdictional tax competition and allocative efficiency, could dissipate when the scale of 
local service provision is expanded (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). Third, the transitional 
costs associated with making structural change happen may be so great when abolishing 
lower tier units and merging them with a larger entity that the consolidated government 
cannot recapture the economies lost during reorganization (Chisholm, 2002). 
Because bigger local governments accumulate more complex administrative 
overheads, they may eventually suffer from diseconomies of scale (Boyne, 1996; King and 
Ma, 2000; Schofield, 1978). Tullock (1965, page 51), for example, argues that eventually ‘the 
declining “marginal efficiency” associated with increasing size would guarantee that a point 
would be attained at which further gains from expansion would be less than the added cost.’ 
At the same time, diseconomies of scope could occur in a single-tier system if different 
services (or governments or agencies) retain their own support functions, and are unwilling to 
cooperate with each other. For instance, the so-called “silo mentality” that is sometimes 
thought to be present within the big departments within larger local governments (Cowell and 
Martin, 2003), may pose particular problems for the corporate centre of a newly consolidated 
organization that is seeking to reduce administrative duplication. 
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Consolidating several smaller lower tier units into a single higher tier may lead to the 
loss of the distinctive benefits associated with small-scale systems. In particular, advocates of 
fiscal decentralization claim that small units within a multi-tier local government system are 
best because this promotes efficiency-enhancing competition in a bid to attract mobile 
residents and businesses. Salmon (1987, page 32), for example, argues that in a horizontally 
fragmented system there is greater “incentive to do better than local government in other 
jurisdictions in terms of levels and qualities of services, of levels of taxes or of more general 
economic and social indicators”. Furthermore, smaller local governments may be closer to 
the communities that they serve and therefore provide better allocative efficiency than larger 
units (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). All of these advantages could be lost following 
vertical consolidation. 
In addition to the problem of bureaucratic congestion and the loss of the advantages 
of a decentralized system, consolidated local governments confront the challenge of 
managing the reorganization process. Organizational theories of structural change suggest 
that any positive effects from reorganization may take a long time to emerge in the face of 
disruption to existing routines and practices (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Within 
consolidating local governments, disruptive effects can include: goal displacement as 
politicians and managers are distracted from core responsibilities; high turnover, especially 
amongst dissatisfied managers who may leave or take early retirement; and ‘planning blight’, 
as strategic decisions are put on hold. “Overspending” may also occur, as governments ‘lock 
in’ preferred expenditures before consolidation takes place (Chisholm 2002). Hinnerich 
(2009) and Jordahl and Liang (2010) provide evidence that merging Swedish local 
governments accumulated excessive debts prior to being reorganized in the 1950s and 1970s.   
 The present study of local government vertical consolidation therefore adds to the prior 
literature in three ways: first, a systematic analysis of the implications of consolidating 
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several lower-tier units into a single tier for financial sustainability is offered; second, the 
consequences of the change process for financial sustainability is incorporated in the analysis 
by capturing disruptive effects occurring before the new organizations begin their work; this, 
in turn, permits assessment of the extent to which the potential realisation of scale and scope 
economies might outweigh the disruptive effects of the process of restructuring itself.  
 
3 Empirical context, data and methods 
English local governments are elected bodies that operate in territorially bounded 
geographical areas, employ professional career staff, and generally receive over two-thirds of 
their income from the UK central government. They are multi-purpose authorities delivering 
services in the areas of education, social care, land-use planning, waste management, public 
housing, leisure and culture, and welfare benefits. In England, prior to the consolidations that 
took place in 2009, there were 386 local governments of five types. 32 London boroughs, 36 
metropolitan boroughs, and 46 unitary authorities mostly in urban areas delivering all of the 
services listed above; and in rural areas 34 county councils administering education and 
social services, and 238 district councils providing welfare and regulatory services. The areas 
served by county and district councils are the focus of this study.  
County councils were first created in 1888, to carry out a range of public functions 
across the rural shires of England and Wales, whilst (with the exception of London county 
council) county boroughs were responsible for services in urban areas. During the 1890s, 
further reforms sub-divided the shires creating lower-tier district councils (Boyne and Cole, 
1996). Then, in 1974, a formal two-tier structure of 39 counties and 296 districts was 
inaugurated. This structure was partially dismantled in some areas during the 1990s through 
the establishment of new unitary authorities providing all of the services previously delivered 
by district and county councils in large towns and smaller cities. Thereafter, this unitary, 
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single-tier full provision model became UK central government’s preferred option for the 
local government system within rural areas, culminating in an invitation in 2006 to the 34 
remaining two-tier areas to submit proposals for cross-county consolidation into a single tier 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006b). Such consolidation would 
also see the abolition of the district councils within the consolidated areas. 
In 2007, 26 proposals for consolidation were submitted from two-tier areas across 
England, of which 16 met central government’s initial specified criteria and were put to a 
full, public consultation. Following this consultation and further assessment by officials and 
independent financial consultants, proposals for full consolidation from only five two-tier 
areas were given the go-ahead, along with a two-unitary option for two other areas, and on 1 
April 2009 nine new unitary councils were established. In five county areas (Cornwall, 
Durham, Northumberland, Shropshire and Wiltshire) the district councils were abolished 
with the county councils becoming unitary authorities, providing all of the local public 
services within the jurisdiction that they serve. In two areas (Bedfordshire and Cheshire), the 
county and district councils were abolished and two new unitary authorities established in 
each area providing all of the services previously provided by the county and district 
councils. 
The data used in this study to analyze the effects of consolidation on the areas 
receiving this policy “treatment” are drawn from two main sources: the Department for 
Communities and Local Government’s Revenue expenditure and socio-economic deprivation 
statistics; and, the UK national census statistics and annual mid-term population estimates 
published by the Office of National Statistics. To facilitate the analysis of the effects of 
consolidation on financial sustainability it is necessary to define a unit of analysis that can be 
observed before and after consolidation occurs. Hence, to develop a longitudinal set of 
measures that pre-date and post-date the consolidations that took place in 2009, the financial 
 12 
statistics for the district councils in each county area were aggregated together with those for 
the county council to get expenditure figures and measures of fiscal health for the entirety of 
the local government system within each county area. This transformation was applied to the 
consolidated areas in the period prior to reorganization (i.e. before 2009) and to the non-
consolidated areas throughout the study period (2003-2012). However, for the two split 
counties that emerged from the reform of 2009, a slightly more complicated aggregation 
procedure was required for the period prior to consolidation. First, the financial statistics for 
the district councils that were absorbed into the new single-tier units were aggregated. Next, 
the proportion of the county council expenditure that was spent within the areas that were 
later consolidated was estimated by calculating what proportion of the population within the 
county resided in the soon-to-be consolidated district councils and then weighting the county 
expenditure for the two consolidated areas accordingly. This figure was added to the 
combined expenditure of the consolidated district councils to give an estimate of the overall 
financial situation within the split county areas prior to their actual consolidation in 2009.  
 
3.1 Dependent variables 
Expenditure per capita Theories of local government restructuring suggest that the benefits 
of consolidation are most likely to appear in savings in the financial resources expended on 
services. By contrast, organization theories tend to posit that the management of structural 
change generates additional costs until such time as the new structures have bedded down – 
something that could take many years. Even so, the patterns of spending that are observed in 
the wake of consolidation might vary across different service areas, as the consolidated 
governments opt to economise in some areas of service provision rather than others in order 
to recoup any costs incurred during the process of reorganization. To investigate the impact 
of consolidation on county government expenditures in full, the effects of the reform of 2009 
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on the total net service expenditure per capita of each county is therefore supplemented 
within analysis of the expenditure on the major local government services within county 
areas: education; social care; environmental services (e.g. waste management, environmental 
health); transport (e.g. highway maintenance, bus services); leisure and culture (e.g. libraries, 
sports centres, museums); administration (i.e. central support services); land use planning; 
and, social housing. 
 
Fiscal health While expenditure figures can undoubtedly capture basic changes in the 
financial situation of consolidated governments, they do not tell the whole story in terms of 
the overall financial sustainability of these organizations. To gain a fuller picture of the 
financial viability of restructured local governments it is important to consider the effects of 
consolidation on their fiscal health. There are numerous ways in which “government’s 
exposure to or vulnerability to detrimental future fiscal shocks” can be measured (Jacob and 
Hendrick, 2013: page 17). For the purposes of this analysis, five different measures of fiscal 
health are used to evaluate the impact of consolidation on financial sustainability. 
First, per capita grant funding from central government is measured to provide an 
indication of whether or not consolidation has made local governments more sustainable 
from the perspective of UK government. Second, the proportion of the overall expenditure 
that is funded via the local property tax (council tax) rather than central government transfers, 
or the “self-income ratio” (Carmeli, 2002) is measured to assess whether consolidated areas 
have become more or less dependent on central government funding. Third, the annual non-
tax income per capita is measured to assess the capacity of governments to raise additional 
discretionary revenue. Data for this measure are publicly available only from 2005, so the 
income per capita estimates draw on a slightly shorter pre-reorganization period. Fourth, the 
potential for past fiscal health to determine future viability is evaluated by measuring the 
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level of debt per capita. Finally, the unallocated financial reserves available to each 
organization is measured to capture the liquid resources that can be used to buffer local 
governments from unexpected environmental shocks (Jacob and Hendrick, 2013).  
 
3.2 Independent variables 
Consolidated county The primary question to be addressed by the analysis is whether the 
financial situation of counties that were consolidated has changed in the wake of 
restructuring. To assess the effect of being assigned to the consolidation “treatment” group, a 
dichotomous variable is constructed, coding the counties that were consolidated one during 
the period 2009 to 2012 and all other counties zero.  
 
Consolidating county To determine whether changes in the financial sustainability of 
consolidated counties are genuinely attributable to benefits of consolidation, it is important to 
control for the impact of the actual process of restructuring on the reformed areas. In the case 
of the consolidations that took place in 2009, the business of bedding in the new 
organizational structures for the consolidated counties began in 2006 following the 
announcement of the successful bids for reorganization. To assess the effects of the structural 
change process itself, a dichotomous variable is therefore constructed that codes the counties 
that were in the process of consolidating between 2006 and 2008 as one, and all other areas 
zero. 
 
Post-reform period To ensure that the difference-in-difference estimator captures the 
“treatment effect” on the consolidated counties in the period following reorganization it is 
important to control for the post-reform time period. In addition to permitting the accurate 
statistical estimation of the treatment effect, a post-reform variable can control for any 
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additional confounding effects on the financial sustainability of counties that may be 
attributable to the time period in which consolidation occurred. To assess the effect of the 
post-reform period on expenditures and fiscal health, a dichotomous variable is therefore 
constructed, coding the years from 2009 to 2012 one and all other years zero.  
 
Control variables 
The prosperity of local residents was measured using a proxy for the capacity of local citizens 
to co-produce services: the average ward score on the indices of multiple deprivation 
throughout the study period for each county area; pressures of time and money in more 
deprived areas are likely to impede positive contributions to service provision (Williams, 
2003), which, might in turn increase costs. Economies of scale may arise from spreading 
fixed costs over more units of output (see Boyne 1996). The potential effects of 
organizational size on financial sustainability are therefore controlled by using figures for 
each local government area drawn from the UK national census and the mid-year population 
estimates published by the Office of National Statistics. These population figures were then 
divided by the area of each county in square kilometres to give a measure of population 
density – local governments serving more densely populated areas might reap economies of 
scope (Grosskopf and Yaisawamg 1990). Skewness tests revealed that all the variables used 
in the analysis are distributed normally. 
 
3.3 Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all of the variables in 2005, the year 
immediately before consolidation was formally on the policy agenda. The table also 
compares those counties in which consolidation occurred with those in which it did not, to 
permit a preliminary exploration of the possibility that some kind of selection bias 
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attributable to the prior financial situation of the consolidated counties might be responsible 
for the findings that later emerge from the econometric analysis. The table highlights that the 
counties that were eventually consolidated were smaller, had higher levels of overall 
expenditure, and higher levels of education, central administrative and planning expenditure. 
However, no differences were observed between the levels of fiscal health, or the deprivation 
and population density in each group. The differences in population and in some areas of 
expenditure illustrate the importance of controlling for potential county-specific influences 
on changes in financial sustainability. Nevertheless, since the consolidated areas were smaller 
than those that were not consolidated, further tests are undertaken later to assess whether 
selection bias associated with the decision to allow some consolidations to go ahead rather 
than others might affect the difference-in-difference estimates that are presented below.  
 
[Position of TABLE 1] 
 
 Before turning to the difference-in-difference estimates, an initial examination of 
some basic statistics is carried out. First, a graphical illustration of the effect of consolidation 
on financial sustainability is provided in figures 1-14, before the difference-in-difference 
descriptive statistics are presented in table 2. The figures show the evolution of expenditures 
within counties before, during and after the reform period, with the vertical line in the centre 
denoting the final financial year prior to reorganization. They also illustrate the impact of 
central government budget cuts in 2011 on county expenditures. Figure 1 indicates that the 
overall expenditure of consolidated and non-consolidated counties follows a broadly similar 
trajectory, with the consolidated counties continuing to exhibit a higher level of total 
spending between 2003 and 2012. This pattern is repeated for education, social care, 
environment, transportation, lesiure and culture, and planning expenditures. Also of note here 
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are the sharp drops in education, transportation, leisure and culture, and planning 
expenditures following the budget cuts of 2011, the continuing upward slope of social care 
expenditure, and the u-shaped trajectory of the self-income ratio. This highlights that the 
budget cuts are forcing English local governments to make choices about service priorities.  
At the same time as there being areas of continuity between the two comparator 
groups, there are some distinctively diverging trends in the financial situation of consolidated 
and non-consolidated counties. In particular, there is a dramatic spike in the administrative 
expenditure of consolidated counties in 2008, the year prior to the actual inauguration of the 
consolidated units. This, in turn, is followed in the subsequent years by an equally striking 
reduction in administrative costs to a level below that found in non-consolidated counties. An 
equivalent pattern is observed in the reserves per capita for the two groups of counties, with 
those that were consolidated seemingly storing away reserves during the process of 
restructuring and then allocating those reserves straight after consolidation. At the same time, 
non-consolidated counties appear to be storing up “rainy-day” funds to cope with the budget 
cuts handed down to them by central government (see Audit Commission, 2012, for a 
discussion of this phenomenon).   
 
[Figures 1-14] 
 
The graphical findings described above are given added weight in the initial 
difference-in-difference analysis shown in Table 2. In this table, the financial situation of 
consolidated and non-consolidated counties is shown before and after consolidation occurred. 
The “first difference”, between the periods before and after consolidation, is shown in the 
third column. These figures indicate that spending on nearly all services was higher in the 
post-consolidation period for both consolidated and non-consolidated counties, though 
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administrative costs actually fell in consolidated areas. In terms of fiscal health, the level of 
central grant increased in both consolidated and non-consolidated counties, as did debt levels. 
However, income and reserves levels fell in consolidated areas, whereas they rose elsewhere. 
The “second difference” is presented in the fourth column. These figures represent the 
difference between the first difference for the consolidated and non-consolidated counties. As 
such, they can be read as simple estimates of the “treatment effect” associated with 
consolidation. Only three of these second differences are statistically significant: the 
reduction in administrative costs, income and reserves in consolidated counties. 
 
[Position of TABLE 2] 
 
3.4 Statistical model 
The statistical model is a difference-in-differences panel regression evaluating the effects of 
consolidation on the costs and fiscal health within the reorganized county areas. Fixed effects 
estimation accounts for county-specific (unobserved fixed) effects, allowing for correlations 
between those effects and the (observed) effects of the explanatory variables, both of which 
can bias random-effects estimates (Halaby 2004). Moreover, using the Hausman test, 
systematic differences were found between the coefficients for fixed and random effects 
models of change over time within English counties, so the fixed effects estimator is used as 
it is more efficient.  
The variables used in the regression models cover a ten year period from 2003 
through 2012; these data were pooled and panellized by year and unit of analysis. Dummy 
variables for each year of the analysis (minus one) (π) were added to the model to control for 
the effects of idiosyncratic events within individual years, such as a change of cabinet 
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minister in the national government or the introduction of new legislation pertaining to local 
government.  
The basic specifications that are estimated can be represented as follows, where 
financial sustainability (FS) in county i in year t is a function of the organization’s fixed 
characteristics (αit), the years of the post-reform period after consolidation (i.e. 2009-12) 
(PRPit), a dummy variable coded 1 for consolidated counties in the years following 
consolidation (CDit), and a dummy variable coded 1 for consolidated counties in the 
restructuring period (i.e. from the announcement of a successful reorganization bid in 2006 
until 2008 prior to full consolidation) (CGit). In addition, a vector (Xit) incorporating the 
control variables is included, plus measurement error (ε): 
 
FSit = αit + PRPit  + CDit + CGit + Xit + π + ε  [1] 
 
A further development to this basic specification was also undertaken. To control for 
the possibility that the estimates produced by the basic specification are tainted by selection 
bias, the consolidated governments are compared to the sub-group of eight counties that 
applied for the opportunity to reorganize but were not granted permission to do so by UK 
central government. Restricting the difference-in-difference estimations to these two groups 
revealed similar results to those that are presented for the basic specification, adding 
confidence that the findings for our basic specification that are presented below may be 
robust to selection effects (see Tables 2A and 3A in the Appendix). Nonetheless, statistically 
significant differences between the population and total expenditure of the consolidated and 
this control group were again observed (see Table 1 A in the Appendix).  
To provide further confidence that selection effects are not biasing the estimates 
unduly, a matching estimator was utilised to pair consolidated areas with similar non-
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consolidated areas before applying the difference-in-difference estimations. Population is 
used as the first matching criterion, before the other control variables and the level of 
education expenditure are also utilised to derive alternative comparators. This analysis also 
produced similar results to those presented for the basic specification (the estimates for total 
expenditure are shown in Appendix B; the full results are available on request).  
 
4 Statistical results 
The results of the difference-in-difference estimations are presented in the following 
sequence. Nine models are presented in table 3: model 1 regresses the consolidation, 
consolidating and post-reform period measures and the control variables on to the net service 
expenditure per capita of English counties between 2003 and 2012; the subsequent models 
repeat that estimation strategy for the other key areas of expenditure within English local 
governments. In Table 4, the treatment effect for each year following consolidation is 
estimated for the expenditure measures. Following that, Table 5 presents the results of the 
empirical exploration of the effects of consolidation on the fiscal health of counties. These 
equations, incorporating the same independent variables as those shown in Table 3, estimate 
changes in grants, the self-income ratio, income, debt and unallocated reserves within 
counties. The average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score for the independent variables in 
all of the models is less than 2, which suggests the results are not likely to be distorted by 
multicollinearity. The standard errors are clustered at county level to reduce the potential for 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity to bias the estimates. All of the dependent variables 
entered in the statistical models were log-transformed prior to the analysis. 
  
[Position of TABLE 3] 
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The model shown in Table 3 explains nearly ninety-five per cent of the variation in 
the total expenditure of English counties, with a high R2 of more than 0.5 also observed for 
spending on education, social care, environmental services, transport and leisure and culture. 
The levels of explained variation in counties’ administration, planning and housing 
expenditure are not as high, but are nonetheless statistically significant (see F-statistics). The 
control variables do not generally make a statistically significant contribution to the 
explanatory power of the models, but there is some evidence of scale economies in social 
care and administration and of scope economies in transportation services, which seemingly 
cost less in urbanised areas. By contrast, scope diseconomies are observed for social care. For 
each aspect of local government expenditure, bar housing, spending went up, on average, by 
a statistically significant amount during the post-reform period. Since the cuts to English 
local governments only took force in 2011 and are likely to continue for the forseeable future, 
it is possible that the positive coefficient for the post-reform period will turn negative in 2-3 
years’ time  
The statistical results for the main independent variables of interest imply that the 
supposed benefits of consolidation for local government spending are not yet emerging for 
those English counties that were reorganized in 2009. Although the coefficient for 
consolidated counties is negative in the case of six out of nine of the expenditure items 
(including total expenditure), it only achieves statistical significance for administrative 
expenditure. In fact, substantive interpretation of the consolidated coefficient for 
administration expenditures suggests that, on average, reorganized counties benefit from 
“back office costs” that were nearly fifty per cent lower than prior to consolidation; what 
amounts to a saving of about £20 per capita in the four years since the reform that are studied 
here. This saving in the costs of administration was one of the main inspirations behind the 
reforms undertaken in 2009 (see Andrews and Boyne, 2009). However, it seems unlikely that 
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a saving of this magnitude is sufficient alone to justify reorganization. While there do not 
appear to have been efficiency gains in the provision of front-line services, it is, of course, 
quite possible that one might not expect to see economies here, since in many cases the 
personnel responsible for service delivery are likely to still be employed in the same locations 
doing similar work as before consolidation. All the same, the reasons for the absence of front-
line savings is an important issue that could be addressed both by extending the time period 
of the econometric analysis further forward and through qualitative research in the 
reorganized counties. 
Another potential explanation for the absence of robust statistically significant 
reductions in expenditure is that consolidated counties are still struggling to overcome the 
costs associated with making the new single-tier structure work. The coefficient capturing the 
effects of consolidating counties is positive for total expenditure, though it is not statistically 
significant. However, a statistically significant increase in expenditure on social housing is 
observed for consolidating counties. Substantive interpretation of this coefficient suggests 
that during the consolidating phase housing spending increased within the consolidated 
counties by, on average, nearly thirty per cent, or around £10 per capita between 2006 and 
2008. Taken in combination, then, the statistical estimates for the effects of consolidation and 
the consolidating process suggest that the new counties may have recovered some of the costs 
of restructuring through the subsequent fall in administrative costs. As yet though, the 
anticipated scale and scope economies in service provision do not seem to have been realised. 
All of which casts some doubt on the merits of consolidation as a means to generate 
meaningful efficiency savings from local governments within a two-tier system. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the aggregated treatment effect coefficient is masking the 
emergence of efficiency gains in the later years of the study. To provide a preliminary 
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evaluation of this possibility, the treatment effect on expenditures is next estimated for each 
year following the reform of 2008.  
 
[Position of TABLE 4] 
 
The estimates presented in Table 4 illustrate the changing levels of expenditure year-
on-year for consolidated counties following reorganization. There is no clear pattern in the 
evolution of total expenditure in consolidated counties, but it is apparent that administrative 
savings grew in the years following reorganization: the coefficient for consolidated counties 
is negative and statistically significant for administrative expenditure per capita in 2010, and 
remains significant increasing in size in 2011 and 2012. Although there are only two other 
statistically significant coefficients (education and planning expenditures in the first year 
following consolidation), for certain other areas of expenditure it is possible to discern 
emerging trends. In particular, costs in social care and environmental services seem to be 
increasing in consolidated counties, though the consolidated coefficient does not achieve 
statistical significance in any of the years. All in all, these findings for the year specific 
treatment effects indicate that, aside from “back-office” savings, the anticipated 
improvements in financial performance do not appear to be coming through as the new 
organization structures gradually become “bedded-in”. Nonetheless, extending the timeframe 
of the study would be necessary to affirm this interim conclusion. To explore whether other 
aspects of financial sustainability have improved in the wake of consolidation, the effects of 
the 2009 reorganization on grants per capita, self-income, income per capita, debt and 
reserves per capita are considered next. 
 
[Position of TABLE 5] 
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 Three of the models presented in Table 5 explain over two-thirds of the variation in 
the dependent variable (grants, self-income and debt), while those estimating income and 
reserves per capita explains between 30 and 40 per cent of the variation in the dependent 
variable. In terms of statistically significant control variables, socio-economic deprivation 
appears to be positively related to the self-income ratio, which is surprising, but may reflect 
the larger budget cuts experienced by governments with higher levels of need (Stabe and 
Jones, 2011). The size and density of county populations seems to make no difference to the 
measures of fiscal health. Nevertheless, during the post-reform period, dependence upon 
central government grants increased across all counties relative to the previous period, as did 
levels of debt. At the same time, reserve levels have increased, almost certainly as part of a 
deliberate strategy to buffer counties from their worsening situation on the other indicators of 
spending and fiscal health.   
 Turning to the main variables of interest, it seems as though consolidation has had 
little impact on fiscal health, but may have resulted in lower reserve levels. The coefficient 
for consolidated counties in the model estimating unallocated reserves is negative and 
statistically significant. The coefficient for consolidating counties is positive and statistically 
significant for reserves, indicating that reorganized governments may have built up their 
reserves during the process of restructuring. When contrasted with the state of those reserves 
following consolidation, it would seem that the slack created during the consolidating phase 
was accumulated with the purpose of smoothing over the difficulties of making the new 
entities work in the period immediately following consolidation. Of course, whether or not a 
high or low level of slack is a good or a bad thing can often depend on whether or not one 
believes that public organizations should be “lean and mean” (see Meier and O’Toole, 2009). 
Either way, it seems clear that the consolidated counties of England now have fewer slack 
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resources to buffer themselves from the potentially damaging effects of the central 
government cuts to their budgets than they did prior to reorganization. 
  
5 Conclusion 
This paper draws upon a difference-in-difference methodology to examine the short run 
effects of vertical consolidation on the financial sustainability of English counties. The 
statistical analysis suggests that few of the desired financial outcomes were realised, at least 
in the immediate aftermath of structural change. The findings do not provide strong 
confirmation of the arguments in favour or against fiscal centralization, but are in line with 
previous descriptive analyses of vertical consolidation that suggest the realisation of scale 
economies via restructuring may not be as straightforward as policy-makers imagine (e.g. 
Chisholm, 2002; Faulk, Schaal and Taylor, 2013; Slack and Bird, 2013). As such, the 
findings stand in contrast to the pronouncements of policy-makers and to the savings 
identified in Reinegewertz’s (2012) systematic econometric analysis of the impact of 
horizontal municipal amalgamations in Israel. There are several reasons why this might be so.  
Firstly, vertical consolidation of several lower-tier units into a single higher tier may 
pose more coordination challenges than the horizontal merger of two governments providing 
similar services. It is conceivable that the costs of vertical consolidation of multiple units will 
therefore take longer to recoup than those associated with horizontal amalgamation. 
Secondly, English local governments are extremely large by international standards (John, 
2010), with counties being an especially large unit of government. It is possible that any 
economies of scale have already been exhausted within English counties and that the sheer 
magnitude of effort required for restructuring makes it difficult to capture further efficiencies. 
Finally, English county councils serve rural areas which may have very different needs to the 
urban local governments that have formed the setting for most prior research. Feinerman et al 
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(2011) identify cost-savings from the simulated amalgamation of similar units of rural 
government, but more research is required to understand whether the effects of vertical 
consolidations and horizontal amalgamations vary across urban and rural contexts.   
While the statistical findings presented here illustrate important dynamics in the 
vertical consolidation of governments, the study has clear limitations. In particular, there is a 
need to study the effects of consolidation for a longer timeframe. New entities may struggle 
to make working relationships and structures gel, and elected representatives must grapple 
with the development of a coherent political identity that is recognisable to, and supported 
by, residents (Copus, Crowe and Clark, 2005). Future studies of vertical consolidation and 
financial sustainability should therefore seek to build on this analysis of short run effects by 
analysing the medium to long run effects of reform some ten years or more after it has 
occurred. A further limitation of the study is the small sample size. While the restructuring of 
English county areas that occurred in 2008 represents a valuable ‘natural experiment’ which 
facilitates analysis of the effects of vertical consolidation, it is difficult to generalize the 
findings from such a small treatment group. Finally, although the effects of central 
government budget cuts are partially controlled through the inclusion of year fixed effects, 
in-depth case studies within the new governments would be needed to disentangle how, and 
in what ways, their financial management has been affected by the reduction in their budgets. 
Econometric analyses of the impact of vertical consolidations undertaken during times of 
fiscal plenty would also provide a valuable counterpoint to the unique circumstances English 
local governments currently confront. 
The findings from this study indicate that it is possible to gain improvements in 
administrative efficiency from vertical consolidation, but that the full costs of the 
restructuring process may take time to recoup. Arguments for and against fiscal 
(de)centralisation thus receive mixed support from this analysis of the financial sustainability 
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of English local governments. All of which suggests that large-scale structural reforms should 
only be undertaken on the basis of careful long-term financial projections, rather than the 
short-term political imperative of making quick savings.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (2005)  
 
 All Consolidated  Non-
consolidated 
Difference 
Observations 36 9 27  
Expenditure per capita     
Total 1461.0 
(96.7) 
1538.1 
(115.8) 
1435.2 
(765.6) 
102.9* 
Education   675.6 
(54.3) 
716.9 
(63.9) 
661.8 
(43.8) 
55.1* 
Social care 308.0 
(33.1) 
314.5 
(40.2) 
305.8 
(30.9) 
8.7 
Environment 82.9 
(8.2) 
86.7 
(8.5) 
81.6 
(7.8) 
5.1 
Transport 53.7 
(8.4) 
54.9 
(7.3) 
53.3 
(8.9) 
1.6 
Leisure and culture 51.9 
(7.4) 
53.3 
(10.7) 
51.4 
(6.1) 
1.9 
Administration 42.9 
(15.9) 
50.8 
(14.7) 
40.3 
(15.7) 
10.5+ 
Planning 30.8 
(8.2) 
37.5 
(8.8) 
28.5 
(6.7) 
9.0* 
Housing 27.5 
(14.8) 
27.3 
(12.5) 
27.5 
(15.7) 
-.2 
Fiscal health     
Grants pc 
 
1147.5 
(111.6) 
1214.7 
(147.7) 
1125.1 
(89.3) 
90.6 
 
Self-income ratio 28.1 
(2.8) 
26.7 
(2.6) 
28.6 
(2.7) 
-1.9 
Income pc 
 
430.8 
(54.1) 
411.6 
(33.2) 
437.2 
(58.6) 
-25.6 
Debt pc 
 
47.2 
(15.7) 
46.3 
(18.8) 
47.5 
(15.0) 
-1.2 
Unallocated reserves pc 47.3 
(18.6) 
50.6 
(22.5) 
46.2 
(17.4) 
4.4 
Controls     
Population 638,042 
(296,011) 
347,777 
(121,182) 
757,300 
(275,958) 
-409,533** 
Population density 259.3 
(136.0) 
218.7 
(112.4) 
281.0 
(143.9) 
-62.3 
Deprivation 15.4 
(4.6) 
17.0 
(6.3) 
14.8 
(6.3) 
2.2 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 2. Financial situations of consolidated and non-consolidated governments before and after consolidation  
 
 
 Before 
(2003-08) 
After 
(2009-12) 
Dif Dif in dif 
Expenditure per capita      
Total Consolidated 1569 1801 232** -9 
 Non-consolidated 1475 1716 241**  
Education   Consolidated 723 769 46+ -15 
 Non-consolidated 679 741 61**  
Social care Consolidated 314 383 69** 6 
 Non-consolidated 306 370 63**  
Environment Consolidated 88 105 16** 3 
 Non-consolidated 83 95 13**  
Transport Consolidated 63 70 7+ -2 
 Non-consolidated 57 67 9**  
Leisure and culture Consolidated 55 56 1 2 
 Non-consolidated 51 50 -1+  
Administration Consolidated 61 49 -13 -17** 
 Non-consolidated 50 54 4  
Planning Consolidated 37 35 -2 -4 
 Non-consolidated 28 30 2  
Housing Consolidated 31 34 3 3 
 Non-consolidated 27 28 0  
Fiscal health      
Grants pc Consolidated 1214 1429 215** 11 
 Non-consolidated 1140 1345 204**  
Self-income ratio Consolidated 27 27 0 0 
 Non-consolidated 29 29 0  
Income pc (05-08) Consolidated 470 423 -47 -85** 
 Non-consolidated 463 501 38*  
Debt pc Consolidated 45 65 19+ 3 
 Non-consolidated 45 61 16**  
Unallocated reserves pc Consolidated 55 44 -11 -22** 
 Non-consolidated 46 58 11*  
Note: + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 3. Local government consolidation and expenditure per capita (log) 
 
Variable Total Education Social care Env’ment Transport Leisure & 
Culture 
Admin Planning Housing 
Consolidated 
(2009-12) 
-.012 
(.013) 
-.026 
(.021) 
-.013 
(.012) 
.030 
(.039) 
-.045 
(.060) 
.034 
(.036) 
-.488** 
(.119) 
-.151 
(.095) 
.219 
(.257) 
Consolidating 
(2006-08) 
.005 
(.006) 
-.001 
(.011) 
-.015 
(.012) 
.014 
(.019) 
.003 
(.038) 
-.013 
(.022) 
-.080 
(.087) 
-.067 
(.049) 
.265* 
(.125) 
Post-reform period 
(2009-12) 
.391** 
(.012) 
.354** 
(.017) 
.411** 
(.022) 
.402** 
(.028) 
.518** 
(.047) 
.217** 
(.035) 
.380** 
(.087) 
.330** 
(.085) 
.270 
(.180) 
Deprivation .0002 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.002) 
.005* 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.004) 
.006 
(.007) 
-.0002 
(.004) 
.001 
(.011) 
-.006 
(.005) 
-.006 
(.024) 
Population -2.67E-07 
(4.48E-07) 
-4.53E-07 
(6.53E-07) 
-2.02E-06* 
(9.24E-07) 
-8.23E-07 
(1.35E-06) 
9.87E-07 
(1.38E-06) 
4.74E-07 
(1.14E-06) 
-6.82E-06* 
(3.44E-06) 
2.93E-06 
(2.52E-06) 
5.07E-06 
(5.91E-06) 
Population density  .001 
(.001) 
.002 
(.001) 
.004+ 
(.002) 
-.0001 
(.002) 
-.006* 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.002) 
.004 
(.006) 
-.006 
(.005) 
.002 
(.010) 
Constant 7.014** 
(.177) 
6.176** 
(.294) 
5.809** 
(.304) 
4.753** 
(.491) 
4.785** 
(.633) 
3.790** 
(.468) 
7.133** 
(1.438) 
3.051 
(.929) 
-.627 
(2.321) 
F statistic 827.65** 604.27** 193.38** 141.32** 59.81** 28.84** 12.71** 15.21** 7.21** 
R2 .96 .87 .86 .77 .73 .60 .27 .39 .18 
Notes: number of observations = 360. + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by local government. Dummy 
variables for individual years not shown. 
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Table 4. Local government consolidation and expenditure per capita (log) (year specific treatment effects) 
 
Variable Total Education Social care Env’ment Transport Leisure & 
Culture 
Admin Planning Housing 
Consolidated 2009 -.013 
(.016) 
-.043* 
(.018) 
-.045 
(.051) 
.015 
(.052) 
-.024 
(.061) 
.021 
(.052) 
-.415 
(.250) 
-.286** 
(.103) 
.109 
(.248) 
Consolidated 2010 -.019 
(.015) 
-.010 
(.021) 
-.031 
(.032) 
.013 
(.042) 
-.034 
(.056) 
.047 
(.044) 
-.470** 
(.129) 
-.033 
(.110) 
.230 
(.261) 
Consolidated 2011 -.004 
(.016) 
-.008 
(.034) 
.003 
(.042) 
.040 
(.051) 
-.065 
(.075) 
.045 
(.048) 
-.564** 
(.132) 
-.062 
(.105) 
.316 
(.317) 
Consolidated 2012 -.010 
(.022) 
-.042 
(.051) 
.027 
(.039) 
.053 
(.066) 
-.060 
(.075) 
.022 
(.048) 
-.512** 
(.128) 
-.209 
(.137) 
.236 
(.312) 
R2 .96 .87 .87 .77 .73 .60 .27 .42 .18 
 
Notes: number of observations = 360. + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by local government. All equations 
control for all the other variables included in Table 3. Dummy variables for individual years not shown. 
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Table 5. Local government consolidation and fiscal health 
 
Variable Grants per capita Self-income ratio Income per capita 
(2005-12) 
Debt per capita Reserves per capita 
Consolidated (2009-12) -.005 
(.016) 
.002 
(.017) 
-.107 
(.068) 
.124 
(.120) 
-.464** 
(.126) 
Consolidating (2006-08) .002 
(.010) 
-.010 
(.008) 
.112* 
(.042) 
.138 
(.101) 
.150+ 
(.078) 
Post-reform period (2009-12) .257** 
(.019) 
-.103** 
(.011) 
-.056 
(.040) 
.433* 
(.181) 
.420** 
(.087) 
Deprivation .0002 
(.001) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.002 
(.010) 
-.003 
(.015) 
-.010 
(.008) 
Population -6.25E-07 
(6.25E-07) 
3.75E-06 
(5.03E-05) 
3.48E-06 
(2.61E-06) 
2.52E-06 
(4.50E-06) 
-1.14E-06 
(3.33E-06) 
Population density  .002* 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.009+ 
(.005) 
-.001 
(.007) 
-.004 
(.006) 
Constant 6.619** 
(.220) 
3.432** 
(.163) 
6.288** 
(.632) 
2.280 
(1.822) 
5.679** 
(1.172) 
F statistic 446.59** 67.52** 10.67** 21.96** 10.36** 
R2 .94 .70 .31 .66 .37 
Notes: number of observations = 360. + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by local government. All dependent 
variables log-transformed. Dummy variables for individual years not shown. 
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Figures 1-3. Expenditures per capita (2003-12) in consolidated and non-consolidated counties: total, education and social care 
 
   
Figures 4-6. Expenditures per capita (2003-12) in consolidated and non-consolidated counties: environment, transport and leisure and culture 
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Figures 7-9. Expenditures per capita (2003-12) in consolidated and non-consolidated counties: administration, planning and housing 
 
  
Figures 10-12.  Grants per capita, self-income ratio (2003-12) and income per capita (05-12) in consolidated and non-consolidated 
counties 
 40 
 
  
Figures 13-14.  Debt per capita and reserves per capita (2003-12) in consolidated and non-consolidated counties 
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Appendix A.    
Table 1A. Descriptive statistics (2005)  
 Consolidated  Nearly-
consolidated 
Difference 
Observations 9 8  
Expenditure per capita    
Total 1538.1 
(115.8) 
1464.8 
(53.4) 
73.3 
Education   716.9 
(63.9) 
657.2 
(44.8) 
59.7* 
Social care 314.5 
(40.2) 
310.6 
(25.5) 
3.9 
Environment 86.7 
(8.5) 
83.9 
(8.3) 
5.1 
Transport 54.9 
(7.3) 
59.6 
(7.4) 
-4.7 
Leisure and culture 53.3 
(10.7) 
51.3 
(5.2) 
1.9 
Administration 50.8 
(14.7) 
38.8 
(15.0) 
12.0 
Planning 37.5 
(8.8) 
26.4 
(5.5) 
11.1** 
Housing 27.3 
(12.5) 
36.8 
(18.2) 
-9.5 
Fiscal health    
Grants pc 
 
1214.7 
(147.7) 
1161.8 
(63.6) 
52.9 
 
Self-income ratio 26.7 
(2.6) 
27.8 
(2.0) 
-1.1 
Income pc 
 
411.6 
(33.2) 
424.7 
(58.4) 
-13.1 
Debt pc 
 
46.3 
(18.8) 
55.2 
(6.3) 
-8.9 
Unallocated reserves pc 50.6 
(22.5) 
41.5 
(13.7) 
9.1 
Controls    
Population 347,777 
(121,182) 
705,587 
(215,044) 
-357,810** 
Population density 218.7 
(112.4) 
173.3 
(108.0) 
45.4 
Deprivation 17.0 
(6.3) 
16.8 
(3.7) 
.2 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 2A. Local government consolidation and expenditure per capita (log) (consolidated compared with nearly consolidated) 
 
Variable Total Education Social care Env’ment Transport Leisure & 
Culture 
Admin Planning Housing 
Consolidated 
(2009-12) 
-.0003 
(.016) 
-.022 
(.032) 
-.023 
(.033) 
.023 
(.059) 
-.086 
(.079) 
.054 
(.057) 
-.489** 
(.126) 
-.268+ 
(.095) 
.174 
(.326) 
Consolidating 
(2006-08) 
.010 
(.008) 
.007 
(.014) 
-.017 
(.022) 
.033 
(.025) 
-.019 
(.045) 
-.013 
(.033) 
-.115 
(.144) 
-.149+ 
(.049) 
.147 
(.155) 
Post-reform period 
(2009-12) 
.352** 
(.019) 
.317** 
(.034) 
.378** 
(.049) 
.369** 
(.051) 
.558** 
(.104) 
.197** 
(.066) 
.526** 
(.213) 
.236 
(.198) 
.710** 
(.329) 
Deprivation -.002 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.003) 
.005 
(.004) 
-.005 
(.003) 
.004 
(.009) 
.004 
(.003) 
.007 
(.011) 
-.021* 
(.008) 
.011 
(.036) 
Population 1.16E-06 
(9.42E-07) 
-1.28E-06 
(1.50E-06) 
-1.88E-06 
(2.18E-06) 
-1.28E-06 
(2.02E-06) 
4.31E-08 
(2.88E-06) 
3.80E-06 
(2.29E-06) 
-1.7E-05** 
(5.45E-06) 
2.11E-06 
(5.74E-06) 
-6.31E-06 
(1.12E-05) 
Population density  .001 
(.001) 
.002 
(.002) 
.007+ 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.004 
(.006) 
-.005 
(.003) 
.006 
(.008) 
.007 
(.006) 
-.017 
(.019) 
Constant 6.459** 
(.325) 
5.470** 
(.628) 
5.030** 
(.725) 
4.047** 
(.840) 
4.596** 
(1.699) 
2.727** 
(.955) 
11.244** 
(2.262) 
1.285 
(2.256) 
9.302* 
(3.492) 
F statistic 1813.78** 515.91** 198.36** 477.37** 519.05** 37.21** 29.64** 95.52** 14.51** 
R2 .96 .87 .83 .77 .71 .59 .33 .40 .22 
Notes: number of observations = 170. + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by local government. Dummy 
variables for individual years not shown. 
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Table 3A. Local government consolidation and fiscal health (consolidated compared with nearly consolidated) 
 
Variable Grants per capita Self-income ratio Income per capita 
(2005-12) 
Debt per capita Reserves per capita 
Consolidated (2009-12) -.002 
(.017) 
.002 
(.021) 
-.107* 
(.054) 
.185 
(.138) 
-.538** 
(.159) 
Consolidating (2006-08) .007 
(.013) 
-.012 
(.014) 
.093 
(.064) 
.137 
(.116) 
.130 
(.108) 
Post-reform period (2009-12) .223** 
(.031) 
-.012 
(.014) 
.034 
(.107) 
.250 
(.167) 
.436* 
(.217) 
Deprivation -.002 
(.002) 
.006** 
(.002) 
.007 
(.012) 
.0002 
(.010) 
-.011 
(.008) 
Population 7.03E-07 
(1.36-06) 
-3.32E-07 
(1.20E-06) 
6.54E-06 
(7.20E-06) 
5.50E-06 
(4.70E-06) 
-5.30E-06 
(9.31E-06) 
Population density  .003* 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.017 
(.014) 
.006 
(.007) 
.008 
(.014) 
Constant 6.001** 
(.471) 
3.752** 
(.345) 
5.906* 
(2.220) 
-.279 
(2.046) 
5.073 
(3.087) 
F statistic 833.27** 102.85** 30.21** 96.76** 13.79** 
R2 .93 .70 .41 .77 .36 
Notes: number of observations = 170. + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by local government. All dependent 
variables log-transformed. Dummy variables for individual years not shown. 
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Appendix B.  
 
Table 1B. Local government consolidation and total expenditure per capita (matching 
estimator) 
 
Matching variables Population only Population + controls Population + controls 
+ education 
expenditure per cap 
Consolidated (2009-12) -.012 
(.032) 
-.006 
(.022) 
-.007 
(.019) 
Consolidating (2006-08) .022 
(.015) 
.005 
(.006) 
.013 
(.010) 
Post-reform period (2009-12) .239** 
(.046) 
.250** 
(.032) 
.213** 
(.030) 
Deprivation -.001 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.001) 
Population 1.19E-06 
(1.57E-06) 
7.72E-07 
(1.31E-06) 
9.56E-07 
(1.32E-06) 
Population density  .001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.002) 
.001 
(.001) 
Constant 6.499** 
(.353) 
6.807** 
(.277) 
6.707** 
(.302) 
N 120 130 140 
R2 .95 .96 .96 
Notes: number of observations = + p   ≤ 0.10; * p   ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors (in 
parentheses) clustered by local government. Dummy variables for individual years not shown. 
 
 
